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Abstract: We usually hope that social norms discourage injustice. However, we are all witnesses
to harmful norms enforced by governments, such as xenophobia, which need to be contested and
changed. Previous studies have concluded that it is possible to change a harmful norm through
contestation by powerless actors if suitable structural conditions exist. However, these structural
conditions have not been sufficiently studied and, as such, are the focus of this paper. Our paper
begins with a review of well-established micro-level theories of social identity theory (SIT), recast
as a set of 42 discrete theoretical statements. These statements are then re-expressed in the form of
a systems-level theory of macro-changes in societal norms using the system dynamics approach.
The over-time dynamic behavior simulated using this structure is compared to events in two wellknown case studies of changes in societal norms: women’s suffrage between 1830 and 1920, and
the emergence of more tolerant lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ)
norms in the US between 1950 and 2018. Further simulations of the model explore the roles of
anger and social outrage, foreshadowing the ability of simulation-based experiments, such as the
one presented here, to explore in a robust way a wide range of (undemocratic) regimes under
counter-factual conditions.
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1. Introduction: How Committed Social Action Can Drive Large-Scale Changes in
Social Norms
“Never underestimate the power of a small group of committed people to change the
world. In fact, it is the only thing that ever has.” As this opening quote from Margaret
Mead suggests, many large-scale social changes, such as shifts in national norms, can and
do start from the committed action of small groups of people. This paper is devoted to
understanding the connection between micro social identity theory and large-scale macro
changes in social norms.
Norms are an important concept for many disciplines in the social and policy sciences. A
typical definition characterizes a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actor/actors
with a given identity” [1–3]. Behaviors become norms through reinforcement and punishment
by peers, organizational settings, and government [4,5]. We usually expect norms to be
beneficial for society and to discourage violence and/or injustice. However, sometimes
harmful and restrictive norms are enforced by governments and social groups; these harmful
norms include xenophobia and religious and ethnic discrimination, alongside many others
that need to be changed. As governments are generally unwilling to change the laws
associated with these harmful norms, it is mainly up to small groups of committed individuals
to contest (Wiener defined contestation as a “social practice [that] entails objection to specific
issues that matter to people”; in “international relations, contestation ... involves the range of
social practices which discursively express disapproval of norms.”) and challenge them.
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The constructivist school of thought is linked to a significant body of literature on norm
contestation and how it challenges or results in the decay of old norms. Previous work has
assumed that the power of the actor (i.e., those who contest an old norm) is the main reason
for norm decay; therefore, the structural factors behind norm decay or new norm emergence
have not received enough attention. To date, the literature on contesting harmful norms
has tended to focus on powerful state and non-state actors [6,7], showing that a powerful
state can change a harmful norm. For example, Sandholtz [8] studied the wartime plunder
norm and the ways in which contestation changed it. While plundering was acceptable for
centuries, Great Britain contested that norm after Napoleon’s defeat—maybe because it was
never conquered by France—and argued against it. Great Britain used its diplomatic power
to effect this change. Later, an anti-plunder norm became institutionalized after WWII, and
Western states’ opposition to Soviet plundering of Germany entrenched it further. Sandholtz’s
study proved that sometimes, norm contestation behavior can change an existing harmful
norm. In his case study, the norm violator was a prominent and powerful actor in IR.
The constructivist literature on power norm contestation is not limited to the international level. There are also studies that offer domestic analyses. Just as strong states
such as the United Kingdom or China can contest and challenge a global norm at the
international level, there are powerful actors, including elites and government officials,
who can challenge or change a dominant norm at the domestic level. Barnes [6] investigated
how the Bush administration tried to revise the norm of torture and use it to its benefit.
However, this study showed that torture remains taboo in the United States, and the Bush
administration’s attempt was unsuccessful. Sikkink [7] discussed how, during the Iraq war,
a “relatively small group of powerful political operators” inside the United States sought to
undermine the norm of torture to make these actions legitimate. In another study, scholars
examined how governmental actors challenged the global norm of human rights after the
9/11 attacks by giving priority to the norm of counterterrorism [9].
It is not surprising that strong actors can change norms, but questions remain regarding
the role of less powerful actors. This aspect of norm study has mostly been ignored until
recently. Acharya [10] developed a theory based on Slaughter’s idea of “norm subsidiarity”
and considered the agency of weak states such as those in the Middle East, Latin America,
and Africa [11]. This proved that sometimes, non-prominent state actors can contest and
develop new regional rules and norms which become established and provide another way to
understand the global norm (e.g., Pan-Arabism in the Middle East, as opposed to the global
norm). His work showed that contestations by weak states matter, and that such states have
the potential to make changes; this contrasts with the dominant belief in the field.
Another important study of weak state contesters, known as “rogue states”, provided
norm researchers with some new insights. In “Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs”, Wunderlich [12] investigated when such states can be recognized as rational norm entrepreneurs
(creators). This further demonstrates that contester power levels at the international scale
are not the sole determining factor that shapes whether a contestation is successful, as has
traditionally been assumed: there are other factors that play important roles, and those
conditions need much more attention and research.
At the domestic level, it is not difficult to find examples of relatively powerless actors
revising and establishing norms. Obvious examples include LGBTQ rights in most western
countries, abortion laws in Canada, Ireland, and elsewhere, and “marry the rapist” laws
in many western and non-western countries. These examples prove that the committed
actions of small group of people can matter. Indeed, these examples support scholars’
claims that an actor’s level of power is not the only determining factor in changing a
norm: under suitable structural conditions, even powerless actors can challenge and ideally
change a harmful norm [13]. However, those structural conditions have been insufficiently
studied. This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of norms by exploring the
structural conditions and mechanisms under which the actions of relatively powerless
actors can bring about changes in norms and behaviors at the domestic level.
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This paper develops a system dynamics simulation model which captures existing
causal theories to replicate observed real-world conditions. Some aspects of the model are
well known from the literature, but this does not detract from the insights associated with
the specific findings and hypotheses which emerged from our model. For example, we
explore circumstances in which unjustified punishments administered by governments
cause feelings of anger among those who violate norms, which increases the violation and
contestation of harmful norms. In other words, under the right conditions, government
punishment facilitates the emergence of new norms rather than prohibiting it.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains how we build on the
assumptions of social identity theory to create a system dynamic computational simulation
model. Next, the paper “exercises” the simulation model to generate a set of results
concerning the conditions under which the contestation of a norm by a relatively powerless
actor can begin a process that leads to the replacement of the old norm with a new one. The
subsequent sections validate our model results with two examples: the LGBTQ rights and
Women’s Suffrage movements. Finally, a conclusion is presented.
2. Materials and Method: Extracting System Structures from Social Identity Theory
This study views the macro process of societal norm changes as a generic system
that can be examined using the system dynamics method. A central tenet of the system
dynamics method is that the over-time dynamic behavior of a system is determined by the
structure of that system. In turn, this structure is understood to be a set of system stocks
or state variables that are connected via a web of feedback effects, all of which may be
captured by equations within a simulation model.
For example, in his foundational studies, Forrester [14] conceptualized generic industrial production systems as stocks of workers, capital equipment, and raw materials
being transformed into finished products, all of which are connected in a web of feedback
relationships, which is defined by the rules governing a firm’s operations. The structural
rules governing production were gleaned through qualitative interviews with the managers of the firm. Similarly, Forrester [15] conceptualized cities in the US as urban systems
consisting of stocks of workers, housing, and industrial job-producing structures connected
via a web of feedback relationships, which the author came to know by interviewing a small
set of knowledgeable informants, identified to him by John Collins, the mayor of Boston.
When simulated, these urban feedback-oriented structures generated generic patterns of
growth, overshoot, and eventual urban stagnation characteristic of many US cities in the
middle decades of the 20th century.
Qualitative methods for identifying and mapping system structures have come a long
way since Forrester’s initial interviews [16–26], but the overall method of conceptualizing
a system structure as a small set of stocks connected via a web of controlling feedback
loops has remained a core aspect of system dynamics. In this study, the source of the
system structure is well-established, and based on previously published micro theories of
individual norm formation, collected under the broad rubric of “Social Identity Theory”
(SIT). Elements of SIT, including “self-categorizing theory”, as well as a cost-and-benefitsoriented theory of personal risk, coupled with theories of the emotional aspects of decisionmaking associated with anger and outrage, were systematically coded into 42 succinct
propositions; these were then reassembled into a generic system dynamics structure that
presents a macro-level theory of society-level norm change.
This study first presents the over-time behavior that emerges from this generic structure as graphs of key variables emerging from a formal simulation model. Next, these plots
of key system variables over time are compared to events associated with two well-known
cases of large-scale shifts in societal norms within a democratic society—women’s suffrage
between 1830 and 1920, and the emergence of more tolerant LGBTQ norms in the US
between 1950 and 2018. Further simulation experiments with the model explore additional
topics, including the roles of anger and social outrage, as well as the role of antipreneurs in
determining overall system behavior.
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2.1. Social Identity Theory Forms the Basis for a Simulation Experiment
Our formal model begins with concepts and insights from social identity theory (SIT).
Social identity theory explains how individuals’ norms and behaviors are shaped through
their interactions. To SIT scholars, social norms and social identity should be considered
key motivational factors in attempts to explain individuals’ behaviors. In this context, social
norms are informal rules that groups adopt [27], while social identity is part of an individual’s
self-conception which derives from one’s knowledge of one’s membership of a social group,
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership. According to
Turner, group identity is basically a cognitive mechanism whose adaptive function is to make
“group behavior” possible [28]. This approach is mostly used by social psychologists and
anthropologists. From this perspective, there is an inevitable connection between members’
social identity and group behavior. Thus, this approach shows how group norms change
individuals’ norms and behavior (an experimental study on the correlation between norms
and behavior is described in [29]). SIT fits well with this study, as it shows how a new norm
can spread among other group members with shared interests, such that it might eventually
evolve, strengthen, or weaken the dominant norm. All 42 of the claims and assumptions
derived from SIT, on which this model is based, are summarized in Table A1. Our review of
the theoretical background below highlights some of the key elements.
Turner and Hogg [30] proposed the “self-categorization theory”, which is a foundation
on which to build a formal model. Based on this theory, individuals have personal norms
which shape their identities and interests. Individuals perceive similarity with others based
on a given set of interests or characteristics (factors of interest might include history or
gender, among many others. This perception of similarity is a key element in shaping a new
category or group. In this study, we use the terms “category” and “group” interchangeably.
By joining a particular category, group members learn and assign a group norm [30]. The
authors believe that joining a group makes individuals perceive similarities with other
members and experience a sense of solidarity. In other words, people perceive themselves
primarily based on their reference group and its norm and goals. Those shared goals
provide trust (in both its emotional and cognitive dimensions) and cooperation among
group members, and thereby function as a deep assumption underwriting the social order.
Thus, if a person perceives that their goals are different from those of the group, they
distrust the group norms and perceive dissimilarity with other members, leading them to
begin performing dissimilarity-focused comparisons and detach from the group [31]. Social
judgment is based on the comparison mechanism; in other words, we compare targets with
comparison standards regarding a set of interests [32].
Based on this theory, group norm activation and peer influence cause individuals
to depersonalize and self-stereotype. Depersonalization is a cognitive redefinition of
the self from unique attributions to shared category membership and associated stereotypes [33]. Self-stereotyping happens when people identify with a category’s stereotypes
and clichés [33], which leads to internalization, whereby people assign the norms and
attributes of the category to themselves, as when a norm is taken for granted [34]. Those
who internalize a norm begin to behave in a manner which is in line with that norm. This
is a concise explanation of the self-categorization theory which, as we mentioned earlier, is
a foundation upon which to build a formal model.
It should be noted that this theory mainly explains the emergence of group/social
norms which do not contest the dominant norms. According to this theory, once they
internalize a norm, group members begin to behave in a way that is based upon that norm.
However, this is not the case in this study. Thus, this paper expands the theory based on
the existing literature of collective action, and adds a distinct variable of risk taking, which
requires further explanation.
Risk taking depends on the perceived cost and benefit of a particular action. In other
words, individuals in a society take risks based on a cost–benefit calculation [35,36]. In
this study, the cost is considered to comprise negative emotions, and the benefit comprises
positive emotions. These emotions are defined as temporary good or bad states which
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arises based on a situation: in other words, a positive or negative feeling, which could
be conscious or unconscious [37,38], which is experienced in the process of performing a
particular action. Psychologists have argued that humans have five main basic emotions,
fear, sadness, anger, joy, and disgust, which shape their behavior and risk-taking decisions.
For the purposes of this study, we define negative feelings as the sum of fear, which could be
the fear of losing a job or money, or being arrested, with the feeling of disgust due to being
abandoned by peers [4,35,39]. A positive feeling is the sum of anger, due to unjustified
government punishment, and pro-category emotion. We define pro-category emotion
as the sum of the feeling of sadness of having shared grievances with violators, and the
feeling of joy while violating norms and receiving admiration [40–42]. Here, risk-taking
individuals may fulfill interests such as improving their status in the group or receiving
more admiration. In other words, risk is a cultural value [40].
It should be noted that this framework provides for a potential reversal of the traditional pattern of emotions associated with norm violation. Traditionally, violators of a
dominant norm are punished by the government or by their peers when their behavior
causes negative feelings among the group [43–45]. The key difference here is that if violation of a norm arises through membership in a transgressive group, then government
punishment is potentially not an obstacle but, instead, a facilitator that intensifies the contestation of a harmful norm. Such a phenomenon may have been observed at the Stonewall
Inn riots: a foundational moment in the LGBTQ rights movement, when a police attack on
a gay bar caused a significant increase in the number of contesters. In fact, contestation of a
norm sometimes results in positive feelings, as happened in Iran after an “Inqilab Girl”—a
woman who removed her scarf in one of the most populated streets in Tehran to oppose
the norm of compulsory hijab—contested a harmful norm.
Eventually, after internalizing the group norm, group members take risks based on
the calculation of their cost and benefit, and behave against the dominant norm. It should
be noted that this practicing of a new norm contrasts with existing norms and laws and, as
a result, there are punishments associated with it [4,5].
2.2. Forty-Two Propositions That Bridge Social Identity Theory and the System Simulation
Our work views the theoretical literature on Social Identity Theory as the basic evidence that can be used to structure a system dynamics simulation model. In order to
establish a consistent logic about the phenomenon of norm emergence within this huge
body of literature, and to show their dynamic relations and the interpretations of these
relations, we extracted 42 key propositions based on existing SIT to be used as the basis
for constructing our simulator. While more complete details of this process have been presented elsewhere [46], here we review several examples of this work. Claims are statements
which are explicitly supported by at least one citation within the norm emergence literature.
Logical extensions of claims are called assumptions.
Based on the literature, shared interests cause the perception of similarity and, as a
consequence, can lead to the formation of a new group. We show this as a claim in Table 1.
Or, as another example, while much of the literature considers punishment to be a primary
tool in the enforcement of norms, we assume that governments’ unjustified punishments
result in feelings of anger and may increase instances of norm violation, as happened
during the Stonewall Inn Riot. We repeated this process 42 times and created a consistent
logic among the norm emergence variables from the literature.
To depict the logical relationships between norm emergence variables, we use Causal
Loop Diagrams (CLDs). The CLDs are used both to depict the propositions and to build
the simulation model. The CLDs for this model shape reinforcing loops (R1–R17) and
balancing loops (B1–B11). Reinforcing and balancing loops, respectively, cause positive
and negative effects. Each loop starts at a variable and moves forward in the direction that
leads back to the starting variable. We review an example loop below; full details of this
process can be found elsewhere, as can details of other loops [46].

Table 1. Example of Propositions.
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2.3. Telling the Story of the Emergence of Norm Contestation
This short section aims to develop some premises for the model presented in the next
section by telling the story of one possible path through the model: a path in which an old
norm is replaced. This is the brief story of the stock and flow system dynamic model, but it is
important to remember that the emergence of a new norm is not the only story that the model
developed in the next section can tell, and there is a possibility that it does not emerge.
When a person or a few people who believe in a new norm begin to contest the (harmful)
old norm, not only to show their personal opposition but to draw attention to the problem,
it is hard for other members of the society who have a shared interest with those violators
not to join them. As a result, the old norm begins to transform into the new norm, with an
increasing number of people joining the violators’ group. However, these people have not fully
rejected the old norm; there is a likelihood that they may find that the old norm fulfills their
interests better, and therefore resist change and return to the general population. The next step

Systems 2022, 10, 143

7 of 28

during a move toward the new norm is to have violators internalize the new norm through
education. This internalization is necessary because, while it is true that they do not believe in
the old norm, they still do not believe in any other norm: they are a population that might
be convinced to follow other norms. The increase in the number of people who internalize
the new norm means the society faces more violations of the old norm. But violating the old
norm is harder and riskier in the early stages of a collective behavior due to punishment both
from the government and from peers. People are likely to be afraid they will lose their jobs,
lives, reputations, and even their friends and families. With time and the persistence of the
violating behavior, a new norm gains more popularity. This shift in the dominant views of the
population makes risk taking easier and, as a consequence, the violating behavior happens
more openly until the new norm eventually gains sufficient followers to have enough power
to change the old norm through institutional change. Nevertheless, this new norm itself is
always in danger of being challenged, weakened, and replaced by another norm when people
find that another norm fulfills their goals and interests better. Real-world examples of this
story include the paths that LGBTQ rights and the women’s suffrage movements followed in
the US, which we explain in detail later.
2.4. Simulation Model
Our simulation model was formulated as a system dynamics model and created within
a Vensim simulation environment (vensim.com, accessed on 15 July 2022). As is the case
with all system dynamics models, this model is a state-determined system that aggregates
the population into homogeneous classes and model dynamics that are controlled by a
network of feedback loops. In mathematical terms, the simulation can be characterized as a
set of non-linear simultaneous differential equations.
The simulation model was built around four main population stocks, which in sum
are equal to the total population of the society. (A fully detailed explanation of the model is
available elsewhere [46].) Figure 2 shows these stocks and respective flows. Each of those
four stocks represent one state of the population which can be transferred to another state.
In other words, stocks are changed from the old norm population to the violators’ group
population, to a population that has internalized the new norm, to a new norm followers’
population, and finally to any of the other states. In this study, we assume that, when the
new norm population reaches a majority, then public opinion will affect institutions and is
capable of changing the harmful norm. (This assumption has its root in the constructivist
claim that people’s values and opinions have a direct influence on government officials
and their policy [50].) Thus, by studying peoples’ opinions, we can, in some ways, predict
political
behavior. After talking to experts in the field, we selected a 100-year window
Systems 2022,their
10, x FOR
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of time to determine whether this transition would happen.
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growth in the number of contesters who believe in a new norm (shaded yellow), ultimately
producing a new norm population (shaded green). We use the following integral form of a
differential equation to formulate the old norm population with a 100-year window of time:
Old Norm Population(t) =

Z 100
0

(Dissimilarity Rate − Similarity Rate)dt +Old Norm Population(t0 )

There will come a time in a society when the old norm population (shaded red) are
unhappy about the old norm and their situation; this is when the initial contestation of
the norm provides motivation and encouragement among the old norm population. They
come to think that the contesters’ norm possibly better fulfills their goals, and thus decide
to join them. We named this group the violators’ population. However, there are two
possibilities for this group: members may either find the old norm better and go back
to it, or learn and subscribe to the new norm and begin internalizing it. We refer to the
group that is internalizing the new norm as the believers’ population (shaded yellow in
Figure 2). As the new norm becomes the normative behavior, believers transition into
the new norm population (shaded green). Finally, there is always the possibility that a
competing norm will challenge the new norm as time goes on, and the number of people
following the new norm will decrease. This is modeled through the exit rate. Each of the
Systems 2022, 10,
x FOR in
PEER
REVIEW
boxes
Figure
2 is a stock; mathematically, they use the same logic to be formulated in the
simulation model. Full details on the simulation model’s structure and equations can be
found in the published work by Salimi [46].
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Using the Literature
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in the results in
Simulation Model
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the believers’
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Unlike
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aremodel
not cumulative—rather,
Here, we offer
examples
of our claims
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structure. We they
are arithmetic, and we use the equation given below to implement the internalization rate
start from the Dissimilarity Rate and Internalization Rate, which are shown in Figure 3.
in the simulation model and other rates that have similar logic.
The violators’ population might learn that the new norm is incompatible with their own
Internalization
Rate =That
(Depersonalization–Believers
Population)/(Adjustment
to Internalization/3)
interests
and goals.
perception of an incompatible
goal causesTime
distrust
toward the new
norm. Trust is the main factor in gathering a group together to act towards a common goal.
Thus, losing trust in a group norm results in people returning to the old norm population.

Figure
3. Perception of
dissimilarity
new norm internalization.
Figure 3. Perception
of dissimilarity
and
new normand
internalization.

Figurethe
3 depicts
one part
of a simulation
model, education
which we call
Sub
Models
On the other hand,
violators’
population
can receive
and
learn
and2 and 3:
Dissimilarity”
“ Internalization
Rate”, respectively.
In that
the Appendixes
subscribe to the“Perception
new norm.ofThis
educationand
is based
on the educational
resources
are
A andacross
B we illustrate
same process,
claimsthe
andlearning
assumptions
to operationalize
available and varies
differentthe
cultures.
Thus, using
we define
coefficient
as
the simulation model three more times. Sub model 1: “Perception of Similarity” represents
a constant to show accessibility to resources. When adopting a new norm, members of
the process by which people percieve their similarity with violators. Sub Model 4: “Emerthe violators’ group may start to depersonalize themselves or, in other words, increasingly

gence of New Norm” explains how people move toward the new norm from the believer
population. Sub Model 5: “Exit from the New Norm” explains how the followers of the
new norm exit the new norm population. See Appendix B (Stock-and-Flow-Diagrams,
Tables A2 and A4) for more documentation of the model.
After the simulation model was developed, we put it through a series of validation
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define themselves as similar to other members of the new norm population. Thus, the
emphasis is on us and our goals, rather than me and my goals [51]. This process results in
shaping a collective belief or identity among the group, and moves this population toward
the believers’ population. Unlike the colorful box these are not cumulative—rather, they
are arithmetic, and we use the equation given below to implement the internalization rate
in the simulation model and other rates that have similar logic.
Internalization Rate = (Depersonalization − Believers Population)/(Adjustment Time to Internalization/3)
Figure 3 depicts one part of a simulation model, which we call Sub Models 2 and 3: “Perception of Dissimilarity” and “ Internalization Rate”, respectively. In the Appendices A and B
we illustrate the same process, using claims and assumptions to operationalize the simulation model three more times. Sub model 1: “Perception of Similarity” represents the process
by which people percieve their similarity with violators. Sub Model 4: “Emergence of New
Norm” explains how people move toward the new norm from the believer population. Sub
Model 5: “Exit from the New Norm” explains how the followers of the new norm exit the new
norm population. See Appendix B (Stock-and-Flow-Diagrams, Tables A2 and A4) for more
documentation of the model.
After the simulation model was developed, we put it through a series of validation
tests to the greatest extent possible. System dynamics researchers have developed a series
of rigorous structural and behavioral tests, such as dimensional consistency, boundary
adequacy, sensitivity analysis, extreme conditions, and behavior reproduction tests [52–61].
For a full explanation of our model structural and behavioral tests, see [46] (pp. 109–115).
3. Exercising the Simulation Model
In this section, we describe how a system dynamics model allows us to simulate and
evaluate the effects of different variables and conditions on the emergence of new norms.
This is where the payoff from building a simulation model of the theory emerges. This
section contains a discussion of base run behavior for a democratic culture only. Simulations
for non-democratic cultures have been completed by Salimi in her dissertation work [35],
and we intend to present these results in future publications.
Base Run Behavior for a Democratic Culture
To address the main questions of this study, we begin with a base simulation run
to determine the conditions that result in the emergence of a new norm in democratic
cultures (See Table A5 for a description of the conditions). The base run results are shown
in Figure 4, which depicts the key populations and their expected behaviors.
As shown in the Figure 4, the first violation happens at year 10. We consider this an
“initial disturbance” or critical juncture [62,63]; it triggers a powerful response in the society
and moves the system in a new direction. (The so-called first violation, which in the literature
is also known as critical juncture, is assumed to happen at year 10 in the current run but it
might also happen later, when enough people in the society come to a shared understanding
about the old norm. For example, the desegregation movement began in the early 1900s
and had some achievements at this time, but the critical juncture for the movement was
Rosa Parks’ violation of segregation laws in 1955 when she refused to vacate her seat on
the public bus, which later resulted in the Montgomery bus boycott that catapulted Martin
Luther King to national prominence. In other words, that event was a foundation for the
Civil Right Movement.) Thus, it is crucial that the first violation happens at the appropriate
time, when an adequate amount of people in the society have come to a shared intersubjective
understanding and shared feeling about the old norm. We showed shared understanding
and feeling as a parameter called pro-category emotion. It is important to note that these
critical juncture events are contingent, and often happen at the intersection of two or more
independent sequences of events. (For more information, see [62,64,65].)
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there is a crossing point/cross over at around year 68, which Finnemore and Sikkink [3]
[62,64,65].)
called the tipping point. (Dynamics modelers usually reserve the term tipping point to
Figure 4 shows the emergence of a new norm in a democratic society. The blue
refer to a shift in loop dominance.) At this time, an old norm has lost the majority of its
here shows the number of people who follow the old norm; the red line shows the num
followers and its robustness overtly shrinks. The transfer of power between followers of
of people who follow the new norm; the green line shows the number of people w
two groups begins, and there is a shift between new norm opponents and proponents [66].
violate the old norm but still are neutral and might either move toward a new norm o
In the following section, we have chosen to examine LGTBQ rights and the women’s
back to the old norm; finally, the grey line shows the number of people who believe in
suffrage movement in the US, and we argue that the stories that those cases tell are
new norm. We consider a country like the US, with a population of around 330 mill
the same as that of our model. It is important to mention that, in comparing the case
and assume that 97 percent of the population follow the old norm at the beginning of
studies’ graphs to the model’s results graph, we emphasize the face validity of simulation
simulation/at time zero. We study a society in which one percent of the population
calibration. In principle, the quantitative calibration of data which we collected from
real world cases—LGBTQ rights and Women Suffrage—with the data generated by the
simulation model is not possible, since they comprise theoretical statements from the
literature. Since quantitative and point-precise isomorphic calibration is not possible,
then the best we can do here is qualitative calibration. As such, we can observe that our
general theoretical model rebuilds a specific case’s pattern, such as that of LGBTQ rights or
women’s suffrage. The similarity of the patterns indicates face validity and expert validity.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Case Examplar #1: The LGBTQ Rights Movement and Same Sex Marriage
The LGBTQ rights movement was not significant before the 1969 Stonewall Inn riot,
though gays and lesbians were systematically suppressed in society. In other words, they
mainly used the strategy of duck and cover. The Mattachine Society and the daughters of
Bilitis were the two main gay rights societies, and were organizations of a few hundred
members. However, the Stonewall Inn Riot in June 1969 changed everything for the
movement. On 28 June 1969, police stormed the inn and arrested cross-dressers. Angry
people participated in a three-day public opposition of the police attack and publicly
violated the law. The Stonewall Inn riot is considered a critical juncture for this movement,
which we called the first violation in our model. The Stonewall Inn Riot totally changed the
movement’s scope and direction [67]. Although there were 205 people in the bar, records
show that around 600 people participated in the riot—some of whom were not gay. This
means that the riot not only acted as a public violation of law, but it successfully attracted
attention from across society and triggered people to transform from old norm toward the
new norm, as shown in Figure 5A. Based on our model, at this point, a small number of
committed people start challenging the old norm and society faced a group of violators:
this was a time for public education to promote a single goal or shared identity. After the
riot, activists put significant efforts into the movement to educate people and attract more
attention to the cause. For example, in 1970, LGBTQ rights activists organized and launched
the first gay pride parade to commemorate the Stonewall Riot. It began in New York City
and spread across the US very rapidly. Figure 5B represents how fast the pride parade
spread across the movement’s membership in San Francisco. The movement, meanwhile,
gained financial support from the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, and eventually they even
formed the LGBTQ Rights National Lobby. As predicted/explained by our model, through
educational resources and across time, the movement gained more followers across society.
As expected, any opposition of the law results in different kinds of punishments, and
LGBTQ rights followers and advocates were no exception. For example, from 1980 to
1986, the movement faced significant obstacles as social conservatives slowed down the
movement. However, through continued educational efforts and advocacy, LGBTQ rights
activists were successful in establishing relevant narratives at the judicial level, which
facilitated opinion change among opponents.
Public contestation of the laws and consistent education resulted in a significant
increase in the percentage of the US population that believed in the legalization of same-sex
marriage. Eventually, with an increase in the number of supporters and a decrease in
the number of opponents, the movement reached a tipping point in 2010, as predicted by
the model. In 2011, for the first time, the majority of the population supported same-sex
marriage. In the same year, President Barack Obama’s view evolved from support of civil
unions (a middle-ground stance) to full support of marriage equality. Finally, in 2015,
same-sex marriage was officially legalized in the US through a Supreme Court decision.
However, it took almost 60 years for this gay rights norm to be accepted by half of the
population, as is shown in Figure 5A. We reconstruct this figure based on the data published
by GALLUP at https://news.gallup.com/poll/311672/support-sex-marriage-matchesrecord-high.aspx from 1996 to 2020 (accessed on 1 June 2020). Additionally, we found
data from as far back as 1988 and also from 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, in the General
Social Survey (NORC/University of Chicago), for people who agree, disagree, and those
who are neither agree nor disagree, and combined these data with others from GALLUP.
Based on the available resources, there were around 600 people who participated in the
Stonewall Inn riot, and we interpolated the rest of the figure. The blue line here represents
the percentage of people who were opposed to same-sex marriage, which, in Figure 4, we
called old norm followers. The red line represents the percentage of society that supports
same-sex marriage, shown in Figure 4 and referred to as new norm followers. The green
line shows the neutral people, whom we referred to as violators in Figure 4. To build
the green line, we used data from NORC and subtracted the percent of supporters from
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opposers, based on the data available from GALLUP. Finally, the grey line is the number of
people who internalized the new norm: in other words, the believers. We collect data for
that line based on the San Francisco Pride Committee Website from 2001 to 2015, and from
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the San Francisco Chronicle.) It took less than a decade to reach 70 percent acceptance in
the society; this is to be expected, as behavior changes faster after the tipping point.
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who agree with the same-sex marriage being legalized, gradually increases. As was the
case with our model results, in Figure 5A, the movements reach the tipping point and
society then faces a shift of power from opponents of the movement towards proponents
of the movement; finally, same-sex marriage was legalized, and an old norm has changed.
The green and grey lines in Figure 5A,B at first increased and then, as the harmful norm
changed, declined; this shows a pattern of behavior similar to our model’s result. This is
a brief explanation of the movement, offered for the purposes of testing our model and
applying it to a real-world example; for more details on the movement, see [68]. In this
case study, we observe a similar pattern of behavior to that predicted by our model. As
mentioned earlier, quantitative calibration is not possible here, and, as such, we conducted
a qualitative calibration.
4.2. Case Examplar #2: The Women’s Suffrage Movement
In the United States, the women’s suffrage movement comprised around 100 years of
struggles, starting from the 1820s and 1830s and ending in 1920 when women won the right
to vote. The movement existed from the early 19th century, but the Seneca Falls Convention
in 1948 significantly changed the direction and scope of the movement. The convention was
the first of its kind, and around 300 people participated, including men and women. For
the first time, they signed a declaration that included women’s suffrage, legitimizing the
movement for equal rights for women. That event attracted significant attention across the
US and, in the folllowing year, it turned into the first women’s right national convention,
with almost 900 participants. The main goal of the first national convention was to promote
the goal of the movement. The convention’s speeches were printed and distributed across
the nation; following this, women’s rights activists and many students in several states,
including Ohio and Massachusetts, began lecturing on women’s rights to popularize the
issue and educate more people.
The convention in 1848, which was followed by another in 1850, attracted significant attention and shifted people away from an old norm toward a new norm, beginning in 1860 when more than 1000 people attended the convention. We reconstruct
Figure 5 based on the data available in [69] for the blue and red lines. They provide
a list of all 48 states and the year each state granted women suffrage. The blue line
represents the number of states which opposed granting suffrage (old norm followers)
and the red line is the number of states that supported granting suffrage to women
(new norm followers). The green dots in Figure 5 show the number of people who
attended women’s rights conferences and/or conventions during the years 1848, 1850,
1860, and 1890. We refer to this group as violators in our model. Data are collected
from the National Park Service archive at https://www.nps.gov/articles/us-suffragetimeline-1648-to-2016.htm (accessed on 4 August 2020), the American Bar association
at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/programs/19th-amendmentcentennial/toolkit/suffrage-timeline/ (accessed on 30 July 2019), Thoughtco.com at https:
//www.thoughtco.com/national-womans-rights-conventions-3530485 (accessed on 17
March 2018), Lewis, Jone Johnson, “National Woman’s Rights Conventions”, ThoughtCo,
thoughtco.com/national-womans-rights-conventions-3530485 (accessed on 16 February
2021). Finally, data for the grey line (which represents believers and advocates of the
movements) were collected according to the number of people who signed the women’s
suffrage petition during the years 1848, 1866, 1893, and 1915. Data were collected from
The Conversation at https://theconversation.com/how-17-000-petitions-helped-delivervotes-for-women-91093 (accessed on 5 February 2018), from Bridgit Williams’ book at
https://www.bwb.co.nz/books/womens-suffrage-petition-1893/ (accessed on 15 May
2017), from the American Bar association at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_
education/programs/19th-amendment-centennial/toolkit/suffrage-timeline/ (accessed
on 30 July 2019), and from the National Park Service archive at https://www.nps.gov/
articles/us-suffrage-timeline-1648-to-2016.htm (accessed on 4 August 2020) (which was
built based on the data available in Lott and Kenny’s work [69], and other data available
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through newspaper and archives, consistent with our model’s results. As shown in Figure 6,
in the early stages of the movement, due to the high risk of both government and peer
punishment, the transfer from the old norm toward the new one is slow. It took almost
20 years until the state of Wyoming granted suffrage to women in 1969. The movement
also encountered several critical moments. For example, the Civil War brought the movement to a halt. Nevertheless, the movement’s activists made significants efforts toward
public education and awareness of the issues. Even Stanton and Anthony, advocates of
the movement, published The Revolution in 1868 and discussed the exclusion of women in
order to further popularize the problem. Eventually, through public violation of norms and
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consistant education the first state granted suffrage to women in 1869, followed by Utah in
1870.
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some points, but in 1888 the National Council of Women was established to promote
and popularize equal rights for women and, in 1890, those groups fighting for women’s
rights eventually merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association
(NAWSA), with an initial membership of 117,000. This union and its activities resulted in
suffrage being granted to women at the state level, and, in 1893, Colorado granted voting
rights to women, followed by Idaho in 1896. After that, the consistent transformation
of the old norm into a new norm began. After this union was created, the progressive
era began, and followers of the old norm decreased in number. Women of all classses
entered public life. It is imporant to note that, in 1912, the movement gained the support
of former President Theodore Roosevelt, bolstering the movement significantly. In 1913,
activists organized a parade in Washington, DC. Additionally, during this period, Alice
Paul orgainzed the National Woman’s Party, and the arrests, violence, and force-feedings
endured by its members “shocked the nation and brought attention and support to their
cause.” By 1920, the majority of the states had granted suffrage to women and, through a
constitutional amendment, women won the right to vote across all states.
There exists similar patterns of behavior in our model results and in the case of the
Women’s Suffrage Movement; these patterns are shown in Figures 4 and 6A–C. The blue
line in Figure 6A represents people who opposed granting suffrage to women, which
is the old norm in Figure 4; in both Figures, this blue line declines gradually after first
violation. In contrast, the red lines in Figures 4 and 6A, which represent the number of
new norm followers or people who agree with granting suffrage to women, gradually
increase. The green and grey lines in Figure 6B,C increase until the old norm changes.
Again, we can observe a similarity between the behavior patterns predicted by our model
and those observed in the case of the Women’s Suffrage Movement. As mentioned earlier,
quantitative calibration is not possible here; instead, we conducted a qualitative calibration.
4.3. Effect of Anger on the Emergence of a New Norm
Previous scholars have studied how police intervention affects political participation,
as in the case of the minority civilian [70]. One of the main arguments of this study, which
is depicted in Figure 7, is:
Government punishment might increase anger among those who are oppressed
or depressed by the old norm, which, in turn, increases risk taking, rather than
decreasing risk taking as intended. This encourages more people to violate the
norm. As a consequence, it increases both the number of people whose behaviors
are based on the new norm, and those who perceive themselves to be similar
to violators.
To dynamically test the implications of this assumption, we formulate “feeling of anger”;
in this experiment, we keep all other variables the same, and only change the value for the
effect of anger on positive feelings to see how it affects the growth of the new norm population.
In other words, the feeling of anger reacts slowly over time to the effect of punishment. We
capture this phenomenon in the simulation model using the Smooth function.
In terms of the specific parameter values in the simulation model, the initial value for
this variable in the base run is 0.7. The other runs here change that initial value to 0 when
there is no anger; 0.4 when anger is low; and 1 when anger reaches its maximum effect.
The results are shown in Figure 7. The grey line shows the democratic base run in which
the old norm will be replaced by the new norm; the green line shows no feelings of anger,
and as a result the increase in the new norm followers happens very slowly. The red line
depicts the new norm population when there is low anger, and finally the blue line depicts
the population when feelings of anger reach their height.
As is shown in Figure 7, when feelings of anger are low and/or when anger does not
exist, the new norm will not emerge. However, in other instances, government punishment
that triggers anger can accelerate norm change. This is arguably what happened through the
Stonewall Inn Riots concerning LGBTQ rights [71], and the actions of the National Woman’s
Party in the fight for suffrage. (For more details, see “Tactics and Techniques of the National
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Downloaded from https://www.loc.gov/static/collections/women-of-protest/images/
tactics.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2022). (See Table A6 for a description of conditions).
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The results in Figure 8 show a counterfactually generated hypothesis based on different
levels of anger in the society. It is evident that, when anger is high among people who are
Effect of Perception of Similarity, on Similarity Rate
suppressed due to punishment by the government, the rate of violating behavior increases
in society. This happened both during the Stonewall Inn Riots during the LGBTQ rights
movement, when the police raid on a gay club caused a significant increase in the number
of contesters, and in the suffrage movement as a result of the National Woman’s Party’s
actions, arrests, hunger strikes, and force-feedings. But what if government punishment
in fact causes few feelings of anger? The grey lines in Figure 8 show this scenario. As we
can see, low levels of anger result in less positive feeling towards violators and lower rates
of violating behavior; as a consequence, new norm followers do not grow to even half of
the population.
This hypothesis emphasizes that governments potentially need to be cautious when
it comes to punishing violators. If punishing violators would be perceived as unjustified,
or the punishment considered illegitimate, triggering anger, then the punishment could
(A)
(B) their punishments and reduce
backfire. Thus, governments usually seek a policy to justify
the
feelings of anger.
Figure 8. Respectively, (A) and (B) represent positive feelings and the effect of perceived similarity
on similarity rates under asymmetric feelings of anger. (It should be noted that the variable “Effect
of Perception of Similarity on Similarity Rate” depicts how changes in the perception of similarity
based on shared interests within a society affect the transition from the old norm toward the violators’ population. Here, we investigate how different levels of anger can affect the perception of similarity between other people and the violators’ population. Here, we study how different levels of
anger affect the variable perception of similarity and, as a consequence, the effect of the perception
of similarity on the similarity rate. See Appendix B for further details.) The blue line show positive
feeling and the effect of the perception of similarity on the transfer rate during a high anger run.
Similarly, the grey lines represent positive feelings and the effect of the perception of similarity on
the transfer rate for the democratic base run; the red lines depict positive feelings and the effect of
the perception of similarity on the transfer rate for the low anger run; finally, the green lines show
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contesting norm population can explained by looking at the graphs in Figure 8. An increase in feelings of anger increases positive feelings, which, in turn, increase the benefit
of taking risks and, consequently, of engaging in violating behaviors. If those feelings of
anger are suppressed, we see the opposite results. An increase in violating behavior has
another side effect. It causes more people from outside the group to notice the ongoing
17 of 28
violation and, due to emotional ties, perceive similarity. As a result, they join the violators’
group, which further weakens the old norm.

Positive Feelings

Effect of Perception of Similarity, on Similarity Rate
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Similarly, the grey lines represent positive feelings and the effect of the perception of similarity on
the perception of similarity on the transfer rate for the low anger run; finally, the green lines show
the transfer rate for the democratic base run; the red lines depict positive feelings and the effect of
the perception of similarity on the transfer rate for the low anger run; finally, the green lines show
positive feelings and the effect of the perception of similarity on the transfer rate for a situation when
there are no feelings of anger.

5. Summary of Dynamics of Norm Change within a Democratic Culture
This study began with the question: under what conditions does powerless individual
actors’ contestation of harmful dominant norms cause the emergence of new norms which
result in changes in states’ behavior? The simulation model, which is built based on existing
causal theories, produces results concerning the necessary structural conditions under
which contesting a harmful norm by individual powerless actors results in the emergence
of a new norm. Among these structural conditions are education [72], dissatisfaction with
the old norm, and anger at the tactics used to enforce the old norm.
A major contribution of this paper is its ability to demonstrate how a systems-level
theory of shifts in overall societal norms can be created from micro-level theories of social identity theory. This generic systems theory of changes in societal norms generates
simulated-over-time behavior that is compared and found to be quite similar to actual
events from two well-known cases of changing societal norms. Finally, the simulation
model introduces new counterfactually generated hypotheses, which need to be further
tested empirically, as discussed below.
The results can be summarized in the following statements. In democratic societies,
whenever a sufficient population of a given society comes to a shared understanding that
an old restrictive norm is not beneficial for them and there exist other norms which can
better fulfill their goals and interests, there is an opportunity for their committed action
and for an initial contestation to spark a transformation of the norm. An initial violation
can be generated at a critical juncture and move the system in a new direction, in the sense
that some portion of the people in each society feel positive about that contestation and
even identify themselves with the violators and join them.
After the violators’ group forms, there is a need for educational resources to make
it possible for a considerable percentage of the violators to be educated and to learn and

Systems 2022, 10, 143

18 of 28

accept the new norm, and eventually internalize that norm. This force acting in the model
is not the only necessary factor to have a significant number of violators internalize the
new norm; at the same time, it is necessary to have an insignificant percentage of the
violators’ population perceive different goals and dissimilarity regarding the new norm.
Those people who internalize the norm shape the believers who probably contest an old
norm publicly. For believers, there is always a risk of being punished by government
and their peers when they begin to explicitly behave based on the new norm. However,
for them, the benefits behind changing an old norm clearly outweigh the risks of being
punished. Through consistent public contestation and education, an increasing share of the
society will join the new group over time, and public opinion will force states to change the
law and their behaviors.
The above paragraphs summarize what our model predicts as the appropriate structural conditions under which a new norm can emerge due to the committed action of
small groups. The two case studies of LGBTQ rights and Women Suffrage are two examples among many others that prove how the committed action of small groups can bring
about societal change under the appropriate structural conditions. This validates Margaret
Mead’s assertion.
5.1. Future Work Can Use the Simulator to Explore “What If” Scenarios
The purpose of this paper has been to describe the process of social norm transformation using the lens of Social Identity Theory, interpreted as a system dynamics simulation
model. The work presented above is limited to exploring social norm transformation within
a democratic culture. However, the same framework can readily be applied to the study
of transforming social norms in non-democratic cultures and in the presence of various
counter-factual circumstances. These include, but are not limited to: “what if” anger is
higher or lower (as explored in this paper), or “what if” antipreneurs are more (or less)
active (norm antipreneurs are a group of people who try to maintain the status quo; in
other words, they promote the old norm [73]). Because this work is based on a system
dynamics model, the changes needed to implement such “what if” simulations can be
readily accomplished by changing model parameters or adding one or more feedback
effects to the aggregate simulation model. Indeed, much of this work has already been
started by Salimi [46]. For example, such future publications will explore:

•

•

•

•

The effects of democratic versus non-democratic cultures. The feedback effects in the
basic model of democratic norm change can be parametrically altered to represent
alternative non-democratic cultures, setting up a comparative discussion of similarities
in outcomes between these two very different cultures.
The effects of various levels and types of antipreneurial behaviors. While entrepreneurs
work to create forces that promote changing norms, antipreneurs are those actors who
work to preserve old norms through their systematic activities. Our theory can be
used to explore the relative effectiveness of various antipreneurial strategies.
The effects of various levels of faux activists on New Norm Emergence. While activists
work to attract public opinion in favor of the ongoing collective action, faux activists
are those who work for governments or other rival groups to turn public opinion
against an ongoing collective action by showing extreme violent action. Our theory
can be used to explore the relative effectiveness of various faux activists’ strategies.
The effects of punishment. While punishment is the main mechanism used to enforce
a norm, there are times when governments reduce pressure and levels of punishment.
Our theory can be used to explore the relative effectiveness of various punishment
strategies.

5.2. Limitations of This Study
Even with the contributions that this study makes to the understanding of norm
change, the basic model presented in this study has some limitations and can be improved
in some ways by future work. First, at present, the flow rate “Percentage of Dissimilarity”
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represents the change in the population who return from the violators’ group to the old
norm population. Arguably this is too simplistic. The direction of this flow rate could
be changed to include a percentage of violators who perceive dissimilarity with the new
norm, and instead of returning to the old norm population form another group of violators
with a different goal. A similar situation applies to the “Exit Rate”. Finally, most of the
initial values used in the model runs are derived from the extant literature. They are
necessarily imprecise approximations and, at times, extrapolations. Using more real-world
data would enable the optimization of the model for particular norms and scenarios. This
would provide better insights into different conditions and policies. Thus, another area for
future research is to collect additional empirical data with which to calibrate the model to
fit different instances or situations.
Author Contributions: This paper is an original manuscript from the doctoral dissertation of K.S.,
titled “Norm Contestation and its Affect in Emergence of a New Norm”. The other authors (J.T.R.,
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Appendix A
Table A1. Model’s claims and assumptions/propositions.
Model Variables

Claim/
Assumption

Number of Claims/
Assumptions

Description

References

Personal Values

Claim

1

Individuals’ values have their roots in the
societies’ culture, religion, social media, rules,
and normative structure

[74–77]

Personal Value

Assumption

2

Contesting a norm affects personal values

Logical extension of
claim #1

Personal Value

Assumption

3

The dominant norm affects personal values

Logical extension of
claim #1

Personal Norm

Claim

4

Personal values shape personal norms; a norm
is a tool to achieve goals

[78,79]

Pro-Group Emotion

Claim

5

Personal norms shape personal emotions

[80]

[40–42]

Pro-Group Emotion

Claim

6

Violation of a norm causes pro-category
emotions among those who have a shared
feeling of grievance and, indeed, among those
who see violators as brave and risk takers and
admire them

Pro-Group Emotion

Claim

7

Group violations cause pro-emotion among
others

[49]

Personal Identity

Claim

8

Personal norms shape personal identity

[81]

Violators’ Group Formation

Claim

9

Perception of similarity based on shared
interest shapes a new group

[35]

Risk Taking

Claim

10

Anger increases risk taking

[47,48]

Risk Taking

Claim

11

Pro-group emotion increases risk-taking

[47,82]

Risk Taking

Claim

12

Fear decreases risk taking

[83]

Risk Taking

Assumption

13

Peer pressure decreases risk taking

Logical extension of
claim #12

Likelihood of Feeling Angry

Assumption

14

Punishment might cause anger among people
who perceive the same grievances

Based on historical
evidence
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Table A1. Cont.
Model Variables

Claim/
Assumption

Number of Claims/
Assumptions

Description

References

Feeling of Fear

Claim

15

Punishment causes fear as it challenges
individuals’ interests

[4,35]

Peer pressure / feelings of
disgust

Claim

16

Individuals feel in-group peer pressure to
behave based on the group norm, otherwise
they will be perceived as disgusting and
abandoned by their peers

[39,84]

Behavior

Claim

17

Normative context affects personal behavior

[85]

Peer pressure

Assumption

18

The dominant norm affects the perception of
peer pressure

Logical extension of
claim #17

Peer Pressure

Assumption

19

The new norm affects perceptions of peer
pressure

Logical extension of
claim #17

Perceiving Similarity Based on
Shared Interests

Claim

20

Personal identity shapes personal interests and
the perception of similarity

[41,42]

Perceiving Similarity Based on
Shared Interests

Claim

21

The pro-group emotion makes others perceive
their similarity with violators based on their
shared interests

[41,42]

Likelihood of Defining
Incompatible Goals

Claim

22

There is always a possibility that individuals
find their initial goals are not incompatible
with a group norm

[86]

Undergoing
Dissimilarity-Focused
Compression

Claim

23

Distrust awakens the dissimilarity comparison

[86]

Emergence of Distrust Toward
Category Norm

Claim

24

Incompatible goals cause distrust

[86]

Learning and Assigning the
Norms of the Group

Claim

25

Each group has its own norm and, by joining
the distinct category, group members will learn
about the norm and start assigning the group
norm

[30,33]

Depersonalization

Claim

26

The more members assign the group norm, the
more they depersonalize and self-stereotype

[30]

Internalization of the Norm

Claim

27

The more individuals self-stereotype, the more
they internalize the norm

[30]

Group Behavior

Claim

28

Group members behave because of norm
internalization

[30]

Emergence of a New Norm

Claim

29

Group behavior will become normative after a
while

[30]

Group Behavior

Claim

30

Punishment decreases the group violating
behavior

[4,5]

Group Behavior

Claim

31

Risk taking increases group members’ riskier
behavior or more violating behavior

[40]

Emergence of a New Norm

Claim

32

Legal norms’ strength weakens the contesting
norm

[13]

Dominant Norm/Legal Norm

Assumption

33

Contesting a norm weakens the legal norm (the
population size of either the contesting or legal
norm balance each other)

Logical extension of
claim #32

Pro-category Emotion

Assumption

34

The violation of a dominant norm triggers
pro-category emotion

Based on historical
evidence like Inqilab
Girls

Extreme Behavior

Claim

35

It is always possible that members lose their
awareness and show extreme behavior

[40]

Punishment

Claim

36

Extreme behavior increases government
punishment

[87]

Likelihood to Trigger
Anti-category Norm Emotion

Claim

37

Extreme behavior causes negative emotions
among members

[40]

Systems 2022, 10, 143

21 of 28

Table A1. Cont.
Model Variables

Claim/
Assumption

Number of Claims/
Assumptions

Description

References

Group Violating Behavior

Claim

38

Anti-category emotion reduces group violating
behaviors

[40]

Pro-category Emotion

Assumption

39

The violation of a dominant norm triggers
pro-category emotion

Based on historical
evidence, such as
Inqilab Girls

Extreme Behavior

Claim

39

It is always possible that members lose their
awareness and show extreme behavior

[40]

Punishment

Claim

40

Extreme behavior increases government
punishment

[87]

Likelihood to Trigger
Anti-category Norm Emotion

Claim

41

Extreme behavior causes negative emotions
among members

[40]

Group 2022,
Violating
Claim
Systems
10, xBehavior
FOR PEER REVIEW

42

Anti-category emotion reduces group violating
behavior

[40]
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Table A2. Perception of similarity sub-model’s parameters report.

Variables
Dominant/Old Norm
Population

Transfer Rate

Description and Formulation
Type
INTEG (“Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate”-Transfer Rate, Total Population × P1)
Stock
People who believe in the old norm and are the population
with the potential to learn a new norm
Transfer Rate: Effect of Perception of Similarity on Transfer
Rate × Dominant Norm Population/AD Time to Transfer
Rate

Unit
Person

Person/Year
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Table A2. Perception of similarity sub-model’s parameters report.
Variables

Description and Formulation

Type

Unit

Dominant/Old Norm Population

INTEG (“Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate”-Transfer Rate, Total Population × P1)
People who believe in the old norm and are the population with the potential
to learn a new norm

Stock

Person

Transfer Rate

Transfer Rate: Effect of Perception of Similarity on Transfer Rate × Dominant
Norm Population/AD Time to Transfer
Change in the number of populations who perceive similarity with and join
the violators group

Rate

Person/Year

First Violation

First Violation = STEP (0.5, 10)
This shows the effect of people or groups of people who initially perceive the
old norm to be harmful and violate it before other members of society

Auxiliary

Dmnl

“Pro-Category Emotion”

“Pro-Category Emotion” = SMOOTH ((Personal Norm × “Effect of Group
Violating Behaviors on Pro-Category Emotion”) + First Violation, “AT for
Pro-Category Emotion”)
It shows when population emotion is in favor of the violating behavior

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Look Up Similarity

S-shaped or logistic growth
Relation between the potential population who self-categorize themselves as
violators and perception of similarity

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Lookup Group Violating Behaviors
on Pro Emotion

This graphical function shows how an increase in group members’ violating
behaviors leads to an increase of emotion in favor of the group

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Personal Value

Personal Value: SMOOTH (New to Old Population Ratio, AT for Value)
This variable shows the change in values among the population

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Personal Norm

Personal Norm: SMOOTH (Personal Values, AT for Norm)
Affected by value, this variable shows the change in norms among the
population.

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Personal Identity

Personal Identity: SMOOTH (Personal Norm, AT for Identity)
Affected by norm, this variable shows the change in identity among
population

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Perception of Similarity

This shows the change in perceived similarity based on the shared interest
among the population that joins the violators
Perception of Similarity: SMOOTH (MAX (“Pro-Category Emotion” +
Personal Identity, 0), AT Similarity)

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Table A3. Perception of dissimilarity and new norm internalization sub-models’ parameters report.
Variables

Description

Unit

“Depersonalization and Self-Stereotyping”

This stock shows the population who are depersonalized.
(“Stage 2. Increase in Collective Belief”, 0)

Person

Learning and Assigning Norms

This stock shows the population who are learning and assigning a new norm.
(“Stage 1. Adapting Rate”, 0)

Person

Perceived Incompatible Goal

The population who realizes that they have different goals and interests to
those of the group norm
(“Stage 1. Increase Rate”, 0)

Person

Emergence of Distrust Toward Category Norms

Having different goal results in the emergence of distrust among group
members
(“Stage 2. Distrust Increase Rate”, 0)

Person

Violators Group Population

The population who disobeys a dominant norm
(Transfer Rate-“Stage 3. Internalization Rate”-“Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate”,
Total Population × P2)

Person

Internalized the Contesting Norm Population

The population who internalizes the new norm
(“Stage 3. Internalization Rate”-Emergence of Contesting Norm Rate, Total
Population × P3)

Person

“Stage 1. Adapting Rate”

“Stage 1. Adapting Rate” = (Potential Population who learning-Learning and
Assigning Norm)/(Adjustment Time to Internalization/3)
Change in the number of populations who learn and assign the group norm

Person/Year
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Variables

“Stage 1. Increase Rate”

27 of 32

Description
“Stage 1. Increase Rate” = (Potential Population who perceived incompatible
goal-Perceived Incompatible Goal)/(Adjustment Time to Dissimilarity/3)
Change
in the
of of
populations
a shared
believetoin
Change
in number
the number
populationswho
who have
perceive
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be
dissimilar
to those of other members
the group
norm
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Person/Year

“Stage
2. Distrust
Increase
Rate” Belief”
= (Perceived
Incompatible
Goal“Stage
2. Increase
in Collective
= (Learning
and Assigning
Norm-“Depersonalization
andCategory
Self-Stereotyping”)/(Adjustment
Emergence
of Distrust Toward
Norms)/(Adjustment Time
Timetoto
“Stage 2. Increase in Collective Belief”
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Person/Year
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Person/Year
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Appendix B.1 Sub-Model: “Emergence of New Norm Sub-Model”
This figure above shows the model’s transition from the population that internalizes
and believes in the new norm into a population that behaves based on the new norm. As
discussed in the formal model, after internalizing and believing in a norm, people start
practicing that norm and, after a while, the norm becomes a normative behavior of a society.
Thus, group violating behavior and its effects are the main elements which affect this
transition.
We use the following equation to implement group violating behavior:
Group Violating Behaviors = ((Risk Taking)/(Extreme Behavior Punishment × “Anti- Category Emotion”
× Effect of Punishments on Group Behavior)) × Behavior Coefficient
Appendix B.2 Sub Model: “Exit from the New Norm”
This section shows that, after a period represented by a time delay, some people
change their minds and leave the new norm population. This can occur because the new
norm no longer fulfills their interests, and/or another norm fits their interests better. Thus,
a percentage of the new norm population that encounters this phenomenon through time
will exit that population.
Table A4. New norm emergence sub-model’s parameters report.
Variables

Description

Unit

New Norm Population

Population who accepts and behaves based on the new norm
New Norm Population = INTEG (Emergence of Contesting Normative
Context Rate-Exit Rate, Total Population × P4)

Person

Emergence of Contesting Normative Context Rate

Change in the number of populations who behave based on the new norm
Emergence of Contesting Normative Context Rate = MIN (Internalized the
Contesting Norm Population, Internalized the Contesting Norm Population ×
Effect of Group Violating Behaviors on Emergence of Contesting Normative
Context Rate)/AD Time to Emergence of New Norm

Person/Year

Group Violating Behaviors

This auxiliary shows the increase in group violating behaviors
Group Violating Behaviors = (Risk Taking × Effect of Peer Punishment on
Group Violating Behaviors)/(Extreme Behavior Punishment × “Anticategory Emotion” × Effect of Punishments on Group Behavior)

Dmnl

Punishment of Extreme Behavior

Punishment which is executed by governments to suppress extreme behavior
during collective action
Extreme Behavior Punishment = SMOOTH (Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors
× 1.2, AT for Punishment)

Dmnl

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

This is the likelihood of unacceptable behavior, such as breaking public goods

Dmnl

Risk Taking

It shows a population’s risk taking based on their cost and benefit calculations
Risk Taking = MIN (Benefit/Cost, 1)

Dmnl

Cost

Variable shows the loss and expense of violating behavior. Negative feelings
include feelings of disgust and/or shame from peers, and feelings of fear of
the government’s punishment, which could be the fear of being arrested,
losing one’s job, or economic loss. These are the two main costs associated
with reduced risk taking
Cost = Negative Feelings

Dmnl

Benefit

Variable showing the gains and advantages of violating behaviors
Benefit = Positive Feeling

Dmnl

Positive Feeling

Feeling which increase the benefit of risk taking
SMOOTH3I(“Pro-Category Emotion” × Feeling of Anger, AT for Feeling, 0.1)

Dmnl

Negative Feeling

Feeling which increase the cost of risk taking
Negative Feelings = SMOOTH (Effect of Fear on Negative Feeling + Effect of
Disgust on Negative Feelings, AT for Feeling)

Dmnl
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Table A4. Cont.
Variables

Description

Unit

“Anti-category Emotion”

The emotion which is triggered by extreme behavior and decreases the
group’s behavior
“Anti- category Emotion” = SMOOTH (Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors due
to Deindividuation, AT for Anti Emotion)

Dmnl

Look Up Punishment

This shows the punishment which is executed by governments to suppress
norm violators, which is the ratio of the new-to-old norm populations. We
define it this way, and assume that governments gain their power from their
supporters’ populations; as the number of their supporter/followers’
decreases compared to the contesters’ population, they have less power to
punish norm violators.
[(0,0)–(20,1)], (0,0.1), (0.1,0.15), (0.25,0.3), (0.5,0.5),
(0.75,0.8), (1,1), (1.3,0.8), (2,0.5), (4,0.3), (10,0.15), (20,0.1)

Dmnl

Feeling of Anger

The feeling that violators perceive due to governments’ severe and/or
unjustified punishments
SMOOTH(Effect of punishment on Anger(Contesters to Old Ratio) × Max
Effect, AT for Anger)

Dmnl

Feeling of Fear

The feelings which violators experience due to government punishments, or
fears of losing their jobs or being arrested
SMOOTH(Effect of Punishment on Fear(Contesters to Old Ratio) × Maxim
Eff, AT for Fear)

Dmnl

Lookup Group Violating Behaviors

This shows the relationship between group violating behaviors on
transferring from internalizing to new norm

Dmnl

Feeling of Disgust

The feeling which violators perceive due to peer pressure
SMOOTH (Peer Punishment (New to Old Population Ratio) × Maximum
Effect, AT for Disgust)

Dmnl

Exit Rate

Change in the new norm population due to no longer behaving based on that
norm
Exit Rate = (New Norm Population × Percentage)/Time Delay

Person/Year

Appendix C
Table A5. Democratic base-run parameters’ initial values.
Parameter

Initial Value

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

Learning Coefficient

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling

0.7

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category Emotion

0.5

Table A6. Democratic base run vs. parameter values for asymmetric feelings of anger.
Parameter

Initial Value

High Anger

Low Anger

No Anger

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

5%

5%

5%

Learning Coefficient

70%

70%

70%

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling
towards Violators

0.7

1

0.4

0

Effect of First Violation on
Pro-Category Emotion

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5
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